

Leading in the Army After Next

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As the US Army celebrates its 223rd birthday this year, senior Army leaders are already focusing on how the Army After Next might look in the year 2025. As we move into the 21st century's "high-tech," information-laden world, leadership principles and practices must be clearly defined and differentiated for junior, senior and strategic leaders. As the author posits, "the principles of leadership do not change; only the conditions in which they are applied." Therefore, "the first priority should be increasing the match between leadership behavior and leadership doctrine."

In discussing leadership requirements for the Army of 2025, I will take into account expectations about the geostrategic setting in 2025 of the Army After Next (AAN), its technology and art, as well as the human and organizational issues it will face. In doing so, I will look at the leadership requirements for AAN readiness for warfighting peer competitors, regional conflicts and low-intensity conflicts (LICs). Then I will attempt to predict leadership requirements of the AAN in winning and maintaining peace.

Several assumptions underlie what I have to say:

- The principles of leadership do not change; only the conditions in which they are applied. Over time, we gain a better and more accurate understanding of the concepts and principles, but they were in effect as *Initiation and Consideration* when Julius Caesar exhorted his troops before storming Alesia - although it took us 1,900 years to refine and measure the concepts.¹
- US Army doctrine has attempted to fit with these principles, changing over time, mainly in interpretations and applications.
- Although the principles are the same at all levels, the practices need to be differentiated for junior, senior and strategic leaders.
- US Army doctrine has been espousing these principles for more than 220 years of trusting subordinates and earning their trust, respecting them and "engaging their voluntary commitment to the mission by giving them honest and complete information," but the behavior of leaders in the Army has "deviated sharply from policy."² For instance, although mentoring of junior officers by senior officers is a well-established principle, 85 percent of junior officers report they only receive their support form for such counseling less than one week before the Officer Evaluation Report is due.³ So whatever we say about the requirements for leadership in 2025, the first priority should be increasing the match between leadership behavior and leadership doctrine.

The Full Range of Leadership

For discussion purposes, I will use a theory and leadership model that has accounted for effective leadership in the military and elsewhere.⁴ However, I will focus on how practices in its application will fit with the needs for leadership in the AAN.

The theory is that of *transformational and transactional* leadership, and the model of their relationships is the *Full Range of Leadership*.⁵ The theory explains that leaders must mobilize their

followers to go beyond their self-interests for the good of the group, organization and society, while building the self-esteem of the followers and keeping in mind their self-interests. The most recent confirmatory factor analysis of 360-degree behavioral assessments of platoon leaders and platoon sergeants suggests that the best fitting model includes the following transformational factors:⁶

- Inspirational leadership: Trusted, valued leaders provide meaning and challenge, set examples and envision and articulate attractive goals and futures.
- Intellectual stimulation: Leaders help followers become more innovative where appropriate.
- Individualized consideration: Leaders attend to the individual needs of their followers as well as the needs of their units.

The *transactional* factors are as follows:

- Contingent reward: Leaders reward followers in exchange for followers carrying out their assignments.
- Active management by exception: Leaders monitor followers for deviations and errors and take corrective and disciplinary actions as needed.
- Passive leadership: Leaders wait for problems to emerge before correcting, or they avoid taking action.

Effective Warfighting Leadership in 2025

Consistent with previous meta-analyses of military as well as civilian investigations, the profiles of the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants who subsequently lead more effective platoons in Joint Readiness Training Center exercises reveal behaviors earlier in garrison that are more transformational and less transactional or passive.⁷ Commanders who are seen as more transformational and less transactional have more constructive self-images, create more feelings of empowerment in their subordinates and higher productivity in their units.⁸

I expect that the same will be true in 2025, although much can be said about how this will be played out in practice in the AAN. It is expected to be an Army which will deploy extremely quickly, be logistically self-sufficient, be intelligence-rich and facile, with instant information about its own and enemy forces and conditions. Personnel will be widely dispersed in the battle-contested ground, air and space above. Units will be small and linked mainly by information to one another and to higher command. Organizations will be flatter than today's. These fast-moving, highly maneuverable units will have great firepower.⁹

Given the changing nature of information technology, I suspect that today we are likely to greatly underestimate the state of the art in 2025. The flow of information upward, sideways and downward is likely to be timely, precise, accurate and open to immediate feedback with computerized support for prioritizing and analyzing. Much of the information flow will be by voice input and output and secure against enemy penetration and viruses. It would be expected that all combatants will be briefed on objectives, goals and expectations on a continuing basis. They would be part of, and be participants in, information processing, tactical thinking and mission accomplishment. Individualized consideration would be at a premium in the need to be ready for instant feedback from above, laterally and below. Information overload and enemy infiltration would be problems for leaders to monitor and control. Risk of our soldiers being captured with too much information to be squeezed out beyond rank, name and serial number would also be a problem to be resolved. Leaders would need to know ways around system disruptions and glitches. They would also have to be able to quickly adjust mission plans and

orders to maintain progress toward mission achievement in a dynamic, tactical environment. These are just a few examples of the overriding need for individualization in leadership.

In 2025, the Army will be in transition from the legacy of Army XXI to AAN, and integration will call for individualized consideration. Such consideration would also be needed in integrating efforts in the joint service environment and with allied forces. In general, individualized consideration, as well as transformational leadership, would be important in establishing and maintaining the cohesiveness needed for success.¹⁰

Leadership and Unit Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness encompasses both horizontal social bonding among peers and vertical social bonding of superior and subordinates based on the development of trust and interdependence.¹¹ Strong evidence points to the contribution of all three factors of transformational leadership to such cohesion. Within the cohesive team, inspirational members set examples for others and foster acceptance of mutual goals. Intellectually stimulating members build on one another's ideas and develop a sense of ownership in solutions to problems. Team cohesion is further strengthened when members are individually considerate and show they care for one another.

Just as team cohesion depends upon the leadership displayed within the team by the different team members, so we see a strong connection between the leadership displayed by the formal group leader and the loyalty, involvement, commitment and attraction to the unit of its members. By providing meaning, challenge and a role model of confidence and determination, inspirational leaders help to promote identification and internalization of cohesive values and beliefs in their unit. Intellectually stimulating leaders encourage better use of resources and contributions to solutions to problems, thereby increasing feelings of worth and confidence in the unit led. Individually considerate leaders likewise increase subordinates' sense of self-worth, enhancing positive feelings toward the unit and its leaders.

Researchers P.T. Bartone and Faris R. Kirkland have shown how the critical leadership required for developing unit cohesiveness can be seen in stages from the new unit to the fully developed one.¹² Leaders should be commended for the extent they are able to develop such cohesiveness in their units and supported by personnel policies that avoid unnecessary transfers and replacements. The effective orientation and integration of new members into old teams is an important, individually considerate leadership competence.

Cohesion is a double-edged sword. It is a strong predictor of unit effectiveness when there is an alignment of the goals of the unit and the goals of the organization. But it can also be a strong predictor of the opposite. When the goals of a cohesive unit are opposite to those of the organization, the stage is set for sabotaging the organization. Effective leaders attend to the positive alignment of unit and organization goals. The seamless flow envisaged of arrival into the theater of war of forward-presence forces, early arriving light forces and later-arriving heavy forces requires such positive alignment of all involved. It goes without saying that the AAN will require cohesive units and mature leadership.¹³

Decentralization. In industry, we have seen a sharp increase in decentralization that, at the extreme end, has produced the self-managed team. Such decentralized operations are envisioned for AAN to provide the tactical speed and agility to win battles. "Professional trust and confidence between leaders and led" will be essential.¹⁴ At the organizational level, flexible architectures will

need to be designed of self-contained units that can be detached for missions in isolation, then re-formed quickly and reintegrated into larger units. The speed and tempo of future battle will require flattened organizations with fewer echelons in the chains of command. This in turn will move leaders at the different echelons to rely more on active "managing by exception" to accommodate the larger number of direct reports. They will be helped by computerized decision support systems for situational analyses, coordination, communication, command and control. But it will also mean that they should be increasing the authority, flexibility and freedom of action they delegate to subordinates who, in turn, will keep their leaders fully informed about discretionary actions.

Delegation from one echelon to the next one below it is 100 percent when those at the lower level are organized into self-managing teams. It is totally absent when all actions at the lower echelon require orders from higher authority. A central theme for future AAN research should be "to what extent could every individual become involved in leadership functions?" Does shared responsibility mean that no one is responsible? Can every soldier be trained and ready to take on one or more of his leader's roles when he sees the role is needed but missing? What would the rules be for doing so? How much could current leader roles be delegated? How much self-management could be introduced into the squad, platoon or company? There is an evident trend in the Army to push decision making downward. For example a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) team leader, a junior noncommissioned officer, now makes decisions that a captain made in World War II.¹⁵

In all our wars, the American soldier's individualism has been both a curse and a blessing to their leaders. There has always been a pervasive suspicion of authority and a resultant resistance to discipline.¹⁶ But as S.L.A. Marshall pointed out, our European Allies in World War I could not believe how rapidly we could train and supply our own platoon leaders with "30-day wonders" because of the trait of initiative built into the American culture.¹⁷ Researchers R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy added that our soldiers were self-reliant and combined imagination with intelligence, often making it difficult for their leaders to stay one "mental jump" ahead of them.¹⁸

Teleteams. We are already seeing the teleteam in operation. The teams are connected by electronic mail (E-mail), facsimile (FAX) and telephone and do not meet face-to-face. We know little about how to lead such teams. As someone trying to do so, I can list some of the questions I have had in the process: How confident and certain should I be before sending out a controversial E-mail message that is irretrievable and about which I can only guess at the reactions? How much can I and should I encourage all-channel networking? How do I ensure as much two-way communication as possible and avoid too much one-way communication? How do I decide who needs to know what? How often am I kept out of the loop when team members interact with one another? What is the best mix of E-mail, FAX and telephone? How do I deal with the fact that some members respond immediately to questions, while others take a week or more?

Teleteams can be combined with group decision support systems (GDSS) to give teleteam leaders rapid collection and merging of proposals and consensus about priorities and evaluations. Teleteams and GDSS are likely to provide the necessary linkages among the isolated, logistically self-contained AAN units and individuals on future battlefields. All echelons will need to be trained and experienced in using GDSS and given practice in simulation exercises.

Conceptual Skills

Based on his analyses of cognitive and personality data of generals, D.P. Campbell noted that as a group they were in the 95th percentile in intelligence compared with the population as a whole.¹⁹

They were extremely dependable, socially mature, alert to moral issues, competitive and action-oriented. At the same time, they were more conventional and less innovative than civilian executives in dealing with problems. If this is commonly true for other ranks as well, the Army should place a high priority on leadership that is intellectually stimulating and on selection and training of cognitive skills promoting innovative thinking.

Subordinates will need to be able to follow orders with "intelligent compliance." The union of knowledge and speed will obviously increase the demand for decisive, transformational leadership, highly coordinated communications, keen diagnostic abilities and a buildup of intuition based on attention to and recall of a variety of relevant past learnings and experiences. A balance will need to be sought between the purely rational approach to problem solving and the intuitive. The emotional will need to be factored into intellectual solutions as well.

Martin Van Creveld has argued that postgraduate military education does not necessarily enhance command ability.²⁰ Perhaps some of what is missing is the education in how to balance the rational and the intuitive.

Increasingly, team effort is sought - requiring leaders with the cognitive skills to develop their subordinates into teams. To do this, the leaders need the cognitive skills required to function effectively as good team players.

The technological availability of instant information suggests that research is needed on how more open communications could be made across echelons in the chain of command without jeopardizing coordination or introducing conflicts in messages and threats to authority and responsibility. Strengthened feedback loops, coupled with computerization to deal with overload, would be required. With the greatly increased use of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, firepower, logistics and communications, the spatial visualization of the 3-D battlefield will become as important a cognitive skill to the tactical commander as it is to the engineer. "Quickening" enables the underwater "flying" of submarines by presenting the pilot with a computerized display of what lies ahead to permit advance maneuvering of the submarine. Analogously, I would expect that some form of such quickening will be provided tactical commanders to assist rapid decision making and communication of decisions.

Assessment and Training for AAN Leadership

"The mature leaders leading cohesive groups" envisaged in the AAN call for assessment and training that increases transformational leadership and reduces passive management by exception and laissez-faire leadership among leaders and teams.²¹ Already developed are on-line 360-degree interactive feedback systems that could be tailored for use by leaders at all command echelons. On-line feedback could also be added for senior leaders about the platoons, companies and battalions under their command. Strategic leaders could also receive on-line feedback about the units under their command. They could also receive on-line feedback from civilian "clients," civilian peers and politicians.

Although technology such as the MILES program at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, can provide objective data about the hits, misses and "casualties" sustained by platoons, companies and battalions, research is needed on the conditions under which the data could be used convincingly as criteria to evaluate assessment and training.

Researchers B. Shamir and E. Ben-Ari have already laid out many aspects of leadership for Army XXI

that will continue to be true for the AAN: teleleadership, telemedicine, cultural pluralism, flattened organizations, loosely coupled structures, professionalism and teamwork, just to name a few.²² They expect that respect, loyalty, identification, competence, self-control, inspiration and personal example will be as important tomorrow as it is today.

Shamir and Ben-Ari argue for a generalized theory of leadership that transcends contingencies.²³ They presaged that, as I previously proposed in 1997, the concepts and principles of the Full Range of Leadership are universal, although they may be expressed in differing ways across organizational and national boundaries.²⁴

Leaders are born and made. A strong genetic component has been unearthed in a number of personality traits, such as the absence of shyness, which correlate with leader behavior. Even more significant is finding that as much as half the variance in the components of self-assessed transformational and transactional leadership can be accounted for by heredity according to a private communication from Tony Vernon. A large-scale analysis was proposed of a 360-degree study of leaders.²⁵

On the one hand, genetic profiling will be commonplace by 2025. On the other hand, its application to selection will remain an ethical question. It will be seen as discriminatory against some individuals, for such screening will deny them opportunities as victims of "unmodifiable characteristics." But this is already done with individuals who are shorter than minimum height, which, unlike an individual's weight, is unmodifiable. It is expected that such standards, which cannot be met through development, will have to be reexamined periodically. For instance, chronological age limitations may need to be raised to fit the increasing size and physical fitness of our aging population.

Other Ethical and Moral Issues

Shortening the time available for decisions will increase the difficulties of ensuring that the ethics and morality of decisions are maintained. M.O. Wheeler, writing about current conditions, suggested that "in combat environments, there is usually some reasonable delay between the giving and the carrying out of an order.²⁶ This interval allows some time for reflection upon the order, and reflection may produce a concern for the order's rationale. Why was the order given? What purpose does the order seek to obtain?"²⁷ Because of the dramatic speed of action on the AAN battlefield, decisions may be made and orders carried out that, after the fact, may be regretted as immoral. It will help if soldiers' information processing and response skills, including ethical aspects, are developed and internalized for engagement in the hyper-battle environment.

Author L.S. Sorley suggests that younger officers often have more of an ethical sense than their seniors because seniors are more likely to have been affected by corruption in the system.²⁸ If this is true, then attention must be paid to remedial work on the systematic sources of unethical behavior. Moral beliefs in the value of life may be sorely tested in the AAN when going up against suicidal bombers or 10-year-old children armed with assault rifles. Enemy forces that refuse to surrender, even when in hopeless situations, will have to be dealt with firmly.

AAN personnel at all echelons will be reasonably well educated and may balk at involvement in LICs or regional conflicts in which no vital US interests are at risk. As with Vietnam, their reluctance may also be reinforced by the media and the unpopularity of US involvement. Our AAN military leaders may need to be prepared to deal with conducting actions in which AAN personnel find it unjustifiable.²⁹

Multiple Goals

Charles C. Moskos and J. Burk listed the varied missions of US forces during just a 21-month period between April 1991 and December 1992. They included refugee relief in Kurdistan, flood relief in Bangladesh, volcano rescues in the Philippines, observer forces in the western Sahara, rescue of foreign nationals in Zaire, Haitian refugee relief, food relief in Russia, volcano rescues in Sicily, restoring order in south central Los Angeles, famine relief in Somalia, hurricane disaster relief in Florida, surveillance in Iraq, hurricane disaster relief in Hawaii and peacekeeping (PK) in Somalia.³⁰ Since then, we have seen the Army engaged in such varied missions as combating the drug cartels of Colombia, patrolling the border with Mexico to reduce illegal immigration, and PK in Bosnia, as we continue to do in the Sinai.

It is clear that in 2025, Army units are likely to be employed much more in such varied work than in combat. Nevertheless, the units must be kept ready through training and retraining as the world's most powerful deterrent force and for rapid entry into combat when necessary.³¹

Winning the Peace

The goal of warfighting is usually couched in terms of bringing force, or the fear of it, to bear on the enemy so that its will to resist is broken. But this can be seen as intermediate to the ultimate goal of establishing a lasting peace with the former enemy - be they rogue governments or illegitimate terrorist organizations. Although such a peace will depend much on the new relations that are established between the previously warring enemies, it will also depend on the military forces' behavior during the conflict. As they bring force and fear to break the will to resist, they can also bring the promise of a just peace that is more attractive than continued fighting.

At the start of the Mexican War in 1846, Brigadier General Stephen W. Kearny was ordered to lead his Army of the West of 300 regulars and 2,400 militia from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, south to seize what is now New Mexico and then move on to take California. He faced 3,000 Mexican troops waiting for him en route to Santa Fe. Kearny sent an emissary ahead who convinced the Mexicans that he was coming down with an overwhelming larger force, so they moved out without a battle.

Kearny was determined to win the peace with a people he had just conquered. They were of a different language, traditions and religion, who had been living in the territory for almost 250 years. The figure is an excerpt from what he proclaimed to the assembled populace in Las Vegas, New Mexico.

Kearny won popular support by a promise of democratic government. The *Kearny Code*, based on translation and codification of Mexican provincial laws, became the basis of law in New Mexico. He left a supportive populace behind when his expedition moved on to take California. If he had concentrated on only destroying the will to resist, he could readily have alienated the population and set back the integration of Hispanic New Mexico into the United States for many years. Kearny clearly kept his eye on using his force to win the peace. He exhibited the political sensitivity, intellectual awareness and familiarity with the norms, mores and culture of the environment in which he was operating, characteristics which Shamir and Ben-Ari see as needed by military leaders who must span the boundaries from their organization to negotiate effectively with civilian populations in their midst.³²

The Mexican War provides an even better example in the contrast between the actions of General

Zachary Taylor and General Winfield Scott. One alienated the local populace, hardening the fighting, while the other attracted their support, smoothing the path to victory and peace.

The transformational/transactional profile of the most effective leaders in warfighting does not necessarily match the profile of the most effective leaders in "peace winning." Although transformational leadership will still be more effective than contingent reward, and active managing by exception will be more effective than passive leadership in both warfighting and peace winning, peace winning may call for more intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration; warfighting may place a greater premium on inspirational leadership and idealized influence. Contingent reward and management by exception may be reflected in different behaviors in warfighting and peace winning.

Individualized consideration is involved in taking special actions to deal with local feelings. Given wide media coverage, the actions may become the basis of a change of attitudes in a whole population. Kearny's promises of religious freedom and maintaining support of local authority are examples.

Contingent reward occurs in peace-winning negotiation of rewards for compliance. Thus, Kearny promised protection for allegiance to him.

Management by exception is required to win the peace. Order must be reestablished. Discipline must be maintained, but peace winning works best when it emphasizes the positive as in contingent reward and transformational leadership, but Kearny's threat to hang secret armed opposition emphasizes that disciplinary cautions have their place.

Laissez-faire leadership and passive management by exception remain contraindicated in both warfighting and peace winning.

As PK competes with warfighting for the AAN's services, preparation will be needed at all echelons for the different, sometimes opposite roles required. Instead of keeping one's head down and concealing one's presence in military conflicts, it will be necessary to learn to keep one's head up and to advertise one's presence as a peacekeeper. Overlearning these opposite skills will be required for the appropriate rapid reaction in either war or peace conditions.

When called upon to pacify a population, AAN will need to be prepared to work with police to seek out local rabble-rousers. Equally important will be the need for the AAN to learn how to convert enemies into friends. The reemergence of Japan and Germany after World War II as US allies contrasts sharply with the call for revenge by the French for 45 years after the Franco-Prussian War. The Japanese, the Germans and the French all had been subjected to humiliating defeat, but the different outcomes following victory were partly due to the differences in behavior of the military victors. It is partly a matter of how US military leaders at all levels contrasted with their German counterparts, particularly as occupying forces. Villages all over Serbia have museums displaying the photographs of their civilians massacred by the Germans and Croats during World War II. The Croats and Serbs remain at each other's throats. While the US Army brought about peace in the American West with our Native Americans by almost destroying them, in recent confrontations and occupations, the record is mixed. Historical research may be useful in showing how American service personnel and the Army as a system behave in ways that contribute to winning the peace.

Currently, there is one Active Component civil affairs (CA) battalion and four Reserve Component

battalions. The AAN would need to attach increased importance to the CA role, particularly in joint training exercises with combat units. CA will need to be in a position to perform joint operations with combat units, for instance, to provide both the "carrots and sticks" in counterterrorism missions. Such joint efforts characterized the British and Australian success in defeating the guerrillas in Malaysia in the 1950s.

When warfighting's objective is eliminating the enemy's will to resist, spreading in advance fear and a sense of hopelessness among the enemy will remain important to AAN's arsenal, although fear can often result in unpredictable consequences. If the ultimate objective is winning the peace, it makes sense to spread in advance among the enemy the benefits of avoiding battle and joining rather than fighting US forces. Psychological operations and CA will need to be expanded in resources, planning, scope and readiness, with more complete integration training and operations with combat units. The power of television, radio, the Internet and communication forms yet to be invented, will need to be exploited much more than is possible today. More local culture specialists will need to be trained and ready to serve in the world's perceived hotspots. Relations between combat and CA personnel at all levels of command will need to be practiced to make for seamless operations. Warfighting and peace winning will need to be factored into strategies and tactics. AAN must avoid winning the war but losing the peace, but at the same time not incurring additional costs and casualties in doing so.

Priorities

In looking ahead to 2025, we certainly are not preparing for the last war. However, particularly in an era of stable or declining budgets, we have to take care in how we allocate our resources to preparations for LICs, regional conflicts and the threat from a newly emerging belligerent power. The probabilities are high for future LICs, intermediate for regional conflicts and low for the emergence of a peer power. Even at the height of the Soviet Union's perceived power in 1984 to engage us in a war, 88 percent of 257 US generals and admirals thought such a war was most unlikely to occur.³² But the threats to our national security of LIC, regional, or "great" power conflicts is in reverse of their probabilities of occurrence.

Taking into account both the probability and severity of the threat to security, it would seem that we need to give about equal priority to be ready for all three possibilities. We should seek ways to develop multipurpose tools, techniques, training and organizations. An example would be highly trained, easily transported light infantry with air support and CA capability to combat the high probability of future banditry and terrorists as well as the lower probability of regional and global conflicts. Such infantry could also be the backbone of diplomatic and economic missions to peacefully settle disputes within and between nations.³³ These active force units would provide the "roots on which to graft mobilization forces" and would be targeted against predictable threats. They could be combined rapidly into larger units as needed. Reserve Component units would be readied for unforeseen contingencies.³⁴ Leaders and their units will need to be as flexible, adaptive, innovative and intellectually agile as transformational leaders and transformational teams would be.

To conserve our own forces, we should continue supporting alternatives to using our own troops to intervene in conflicts, particularly when their outcomes are not vital to our national interests. For instance, we should continue to help train a pan-African force for such interventions in the disruptions that plague the continent. At the same time, such training must avoid the creation of antidemocratic military elites such as occurred in El Salvador. High priority will have to be given to working with allied forces in joint actions. AAN will need to be ready to learn from its allies as it shares its skills with them.

Diversity

With the continued movement toward sex equality and the continued increase in the percentage of persons of color in the US population, women will engage in more diverse roles than they do today, and units will be more multiethnic and multiracial than today. Advances in tools, training and technologies, as well as further social change may see women in the infantry. We are likely to see women in combat roles and in a variety of additional combat support services such as flying reconnaissance aerial vehicles.

The entry of large numbers of Asian-Americans into higher education, particularly "high-tech" education, may result in an increasing number entering the officer corps and technical career specialties within the military. Similarly, by 2025, Hispanics will be the largest US minority. We should see larger numbers in the Army if they, constituting the largest per capita Medal of Honor winners for an ethnic group, continue their tradition of seeing military service as consistent with their macho values and as the way out of the barrios. The Army should remain attractive to African-Americans, and we should see more at higher officer levels.

In all, AAN is likely to be less white in 2025, mirroring what will have occurred in the general US population. Learning to lead and work in multiethnic, multiracial and mixed-sex groups will be of great significance to AAN readiness. Similarly, mandatory retirement ages may be raised to accommodate the increasing numbers and better health of older citizens.

Whatever elitism the service academies might introduce into the AAN officer corps is likely to be diminished further, either with the possible abandonment of the academies or the increasing roles of the universities in providing the corps with more broadly educated leaders with more diverse developmental and community experiences.

In looking ahead 27 years, other questions remain. Are we tending to solve today's problems, not the problems of 2025? For instance, 27 years hence, will we find that the antiheroism featured in so much of the media enterprise has eroded many of the values important to leadership? Can leadership as we now know it, with its recognition of the importance of respect, decisiveness and direction, be sustained in a world dominated by glorification of underclass values? Will our future development of leaders be handicapped by less devotion to our civil duties than to our civil rights? How much will self-management take root in civilian life, and how will it affect military organization? What will be the effects of the world's rapidly growing urbanization on the AAN? How will recruiting be affected by the sharply rising obesity and "junk food" nutrition of today's American children? What will be the effect of the movement by more women and minorities into positions of senior and strategic leadership in the AAN? Will we see strong mainstream backlashes?

As we approach the millennium, we are transiting rapidly into the post-industrial information age. Information is expandable, compressible, substitutable, transportable, diffusible and shareable. It is not necessarily a scarce resource.³⁵ As a consequence, it will affect leader-follower relations in ways yet unseen. Leader-follower relations will become increasingly fluid rather than fixed in a person or position, making it difficult to capture what lies ahead for the leaders and the led. **MR**

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Gunmen routinely used willing noncombatants as shields during operations in Somalia. US and UN personnel were also fired upon by women and children.

Lieutenant Colonel Robin Swain (with paper), TF 1-26 batallion commander, walks with Vosic, chief of police in Zvornik, Bosnia (center left) at Checkpoint Sierra 10 before the resettlement of Muslims in Mahala. Psychological operations and CA will need to be expanded in resources, planning, scope and readiness, with more complete integration training and operations with combat units.

A US heliograph team working under fire near Oretz on Argonne, Meuse, France, 22 October 1918.

Signal corpsmen operating in the 25th Infantry Division (Light) tactical operations center during Exercise RUGGED MACHETE 98.

Proclamation of Brigadier General Stephen W. Kearny to the People of Las Vegas, 15 August 1846

Mr. Acalde, and people of New Mexico: I have come amongst you by the orders of my government to take possession of your country. . . . We come as friends - not as enemies; as protectors, not as conquerors. We come among you for your benefit - not for your injury. Henceforth, I absolve you from all allegiance to the Mexican government, and from all obedience to General Armiljo. He is no longer your governor. I am your governor. I shall not expect you to take up arms and follow me to fight your own people, who may oppose me; but I now tell you that those of you who remain peaceably at home, tending to their crops and herds, shall be protected by me in their property, their persons and their religion. Not a pepper nor an onion shall be disturbed or taken by my troops without pay or by the consent of the owner. But listen! He who promises to be quiet and is found in arms against me, I will hang.

From the Mexican government you have never received protection. The Apaches and Navajos come

down from the mountain and carry off your sheep, and even your women, whenever they please. My government will correct all this. It will keep off the Indians, protect you and your persons and property and, I repeat again, will protect you in your religion. I know you are all great Catholics; that some of your priests have told you all sorts of stories that we would mistreat your women and brand them on the cheek as you do your mules on the hip.

It is all false.

My government respects your religion as much as the Protestant religion, and allows each man to worship his Creator as his heart tells him best. The laws protect the Catholic as well as the Protestant, the weak as well as the strong, the poor as well as the rich. I am not a Catholic myself; but at least one-third of my army are Catholics. I respect a good Catholic as much as a good Protestant.

There goes my Army - you see but a small portion of it; there are many more behind; resistance is useless. Mr. Acalde and your two captains of militia, the laws of my country require that all men who take office under me shall take the oath of allegiance. I do not wish, for the present, until affairs become more settled, to disturb your form of government. If you are prepared to take oaths of allegiance I shall continue you in office and support your authority.

[RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS](#)